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Abstract— Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) are 
employed as an authentication mechanism in IPv6 network to 
realize the proof of address ownership without relying on any 
trust authority. The security parameter (Sec) indicates the 
security level of the CGA address. For Sec value greater than 
zero, there is no guarantee to stop the brute-force search after 
certain time. The address generator tries different values of 
Modifier until (16×Sec)-leftmost-bit of the second hash (Hash2) 
computes to zero. This paper proposes some modifications to the 
standard CGA “RFC 3972” in order to limit the time that CGA 
generation may takes. The modified CGA generation algorithm 
takes the upper bound of CGA running time as an input and the 
Sec value is determined as an output of the brute-force 
computations. The modified CGA keeps track of the best 
founded Hash2 value during the running time. The paper also 
proposes to reduce the granularity of the security level from “16” 
to “8”, to increase the chance to have better Sec value within the 
time limit. We called the modified CGA as Time-Based CGA 
(TB-CGA). The implementation and evaluation of TB-CGA are 
done in this paper. 
Keywords-IPv6 security; SEcure Neighbor Discovery; CGA 
performance 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [1] are 
designed to offer the authentication to IPv6 addresses and 
prevent malicious nodes from claiming the ownership of the 
others’ addresses. CGA is an IPv6 address where the interface 
identifier part is generated from a cryptographic hash of the 
address owner’s public key and other parameters. Thus, IPv6 
address of the node is bound to its public key. In this manner, 
CGA is self-certifying since it does not rely on Public-Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) or other authority. Therefore, any IPv6 
node can generate its CGA address locally. 
CGA authenticates the identity of the sender based on 
public key cryptography. The recipient is able to determine that 
the message comes from a real sender. The message which is 
sent from CGA address is signed with the address owner 
private key and the public key is attached to the signed 
message. Since the message contains everything the recipient 
needs to authenticate, the receiver does not need to have further 
communications with the sender for completing the 
authentication process. The receiver authenticates the message 
by verifying that the hash of the public key matches the 
sender’s address and the signature is valid. 
For using CGA, the sender node needs to select the CGA 
Security Parameter (Sec). Sec value indicates the security level 
of the CGA against the brute-force attacks. Sec is an unsigned 
3-bit integer having a value between “0” and “7”. It increases 
the computational cost for both the attacker and the address 
generator. The address generator needs, on average, 2
16×Sec 
brute-force search to satisfy Hash2 condition [2], i.e., 
(16×Sec)-leftmost-bit of Hash2 equal to zero. Large Sec value 
may leads to significant and undesirable address generation 
delay. For Sec value “2”, the CGA address computation takes 
several hours on a computer with 2.67 GHz CPU speed. 
Currently, it is impractical to use CGA with large Sec value 
especially in recourse-constrained networks, such as in mobile 
telephones, wireless sensors, and ad-hoc networks where nodes 
have limited resources (battery, memory, processor, and 
bandwidth). The CGA computation will take too long time and 
consumes the computing device energy. Therefore, the high 
computation cost of CGA may prevent its usage and leave IPv6 
networks vulnerable to several attacks which are related to 
address stealing. 
Normally, the address owner sets Sec value. But it is hard 
for the user to select the suitable Sec value. Small Sec value 
leaves a small margin of safety and large Sec value may causes 
unacceptable address generation delay. Even though in case the 
user knows the details of CGA algorithm, it is hard to predict 
the CGA generation time because the computation of Hash2 is 
completely random, and it is not easy to predict the required 
CGA generation time for Sec value greater than “0”. Moreover, 
CGA generation time depends on computing device CPU 
speed. Consequently, it is better to select Sec value in more 
practical way base on tangible factor that the user can 
determine it, such as time.  
We propose a modified CGA with termination time to force 
CGA generation to stop after certain time specified by the user 
or the address generator. Our purpose is to gain an optimal 
advantage from CGA security without waiting long time for 
CGA generation. The modified CGA generation algorithm 
takes the termination time as an input and then determines Sec 
value as an output of CGA computation. In this paper, we 
propose the following modifications to the standard CGA [1]: 
 Select time parameter as an input instead of Sec value. 
The time parameter is set to ensure that CGA will stop 
after certain time. The Sec value is determined by 
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rounding down the number of zeros in the best founded 
Hash2 value to the nearest multiple factor “8”. 
 Replace the standard granularity factor “16” with “8” 
in Hash2 condition to get an optimal security level 
within the stopping time and reduce the number of 
wasted iterations to find better Sec value. It is obvious 
that the chance to have hash function output with “8” 
successive zero is higher than it with “16”. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews CGA 
generation algorithm. Section III discuses the CGA 
modifications decision to reach the final time-based CGA (TB-
CGA) generation algorithm. Section IV describes the testing 
environment and the TB-CGA implementation. Section V 
shows some measurements for standard CGA and the modified 
version (TB-CGA). Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY GENERATED ADDRESSES (CGA) 
CGA firstly proposed as a mechanism for authenticating 
location updates in Mobile IPv6 [3]. Later, CGAs were 
standardized in the context of the SEcure Neighbor Discovery 
(SEND) [4] to protect Neighbor Discovery (ND) for IPv6 [5] 
and IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [6] against 
known attacks [7]. CGA is also proposed to prevent Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack and to authenticate the Binding Update 
messages in Mobile IPv6 [8, 9].  
A. CGA Generation Algorithm 
In CGA, the interface identifier portion of IPv6 address is 
created from cryptographic hash of the address owner’s public 
key and other auxiliary parameters. Since the 64-bit are not 
enough to provide sufficient security against brute-force attacks 
in the foreseeable future, the standard CGA uses the Hash 
Extension [1] to increase the security strength above 64-bit. 
The purpose of the Hash Extension [2] is to increase 
artificially the cost of creating a hash without increasing its 
length. The address owner computes two independent hash 
values (Hash1 and Hash2) by using the public key and other 
parameters. The Hash Extension (Hash2, or portion of it) value 
sets an input parameter for Hash1. The combination of the two 
hash values increases the computational complexity of 
generating new address and the cost of brute-force attacks.  
CGA generation algorithm should fulfill two conditions [1]: 
1. The leftmost 64-bit of Hash1 equals the interface    
identifier. The Sec, “u” and “g” bits are ignored in the 
comparison. 
2. The 16×Sec leftmost bits of Hash2 are equal to zero.  
The security parameter (Sec) indicates the security level of 
the generated address against the brute-force attacks. 
Increasing Sec value by “1” adds 16-bit to the length of hash 
that the attacker must break. Sec is an unsigned 3-bit integer 
having a value between “0” and “7”. 
The use of CGA requires the sender to send CGA 
parameters to the receiver. CGA parameters are concatenated 
to form a CGA parameter data structure which contains the 
following parameters: 
1. Modifier (128-bit): is initialized to random value.  
2. Subnet Prefix (64-bit): it is set to routing prefix value 
advertised by the router at the local subnet. 
3. Collision Count (8-bits): is a collision counter used for 
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) to ensure the 
uniqueness of the generated address.  
4. Public Key (variable length): is set to the DER-
encoded public key of the address owner.  
5. Extension field has variable length for future needs. 
A schematic of CGA generation algorithm is shown in 
Figure 1. CGA generation begins with determining the address 
owner’s public key and selecting the proper Sec value. Then 
continue the Hash2 computation loop until finding the Final 
Modifier. Hash2 value is a hash of combination of the Modifier 
and the Public Key is concatenated with zero-value of Subnet 
Prefix and Collision Count. The address generator tries 
different values of the Modifier until 16×Sec-leftmost-bits of 
Hash2 computes to zero. Once a match is found, the loop for 
Hash2 computation terminates. Afterward, the Final Modifier 
value is saved and used as an input for Hash1 computation. 
Hash1 value is a hash of combination of the whole CGA 
parameter data structure. Then, the interface identifier (IID) is 
derived from Hash1. The hash value is truncated to the 
appropriate length (64-bit). The Sec value is encoded into the 
three leftmost bits of the interface identifier. The 7th and 8th 
bits from the left of IID are reserved for special purpose. 
Finally, the Duplicated Address Detection (DAD) is done to 
ensure that there is no address collision within the same subnet. 
B. CGA Generation Computational Cost 
CGA algorithm increases the computational cost for both 
the attacker and the address generator (owner). The address 
generator needs O(2
16×Sec
) brute-force search to satisfy Hash2 
condition and finding the Final Modifier. The attacker needs to 
do a brute-force attack against an (16×Sec+59)-bit hash value 
which costs O(2
16×Sec + 59 
). 
Fulfilling the condition of Hash2 is the computationally 
expensive part of CGA generation. The address owner may 
have not powerful machine to compute CGA within certain 
time. Selecting too high Sec value may cause unacceptable 
delay in address generation. For Sec value greater than zero, 
there is no guarantee to stop after a certain number of 
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Figure 1. CGA generation algorithm. 
iterations. Therefore, it is better to force the CGA generation 
algorithm to stop after a certain time. 
Aura and Roe [10] explained the possibility to select the 
Hash Extension parameters automatically instead of manual 
configuration to get more practical algorithm. But this idea 
does not standardize for CGA. Also, based on our knowledge, 
there is no implementation of this idea for CGA addresses. 
Therefore, we decide to modify the standard CGA and 
implement it based on stopping time. 
III. MODIFICATIONS TO THE STANDARD CGA  
For simplicity, usability, and practical requirements, it is 
better to determine Sec value in an automatic or indirect way 
based on tangible factor such as time. This section discusses 
the modified CGA algorithm with stopping time condition. 
A. Stopping Time Condition for CGA 
To guarantee that CGA generation process terminates after 
a certain time, the modified CGA algorithm takes the time as 
an input to determine the termination time. If this time 
threshold exceeds, the CGA generation algorithm stops. The 
algorithm keeps track of the best discovered value which has 
the highest number of zeros found in leftmost bits of Hash2. 
The extension length has to be rounded down to the nearest 
multiple integer of “16” or “8” to determine the security level 
for the rest of the CGA generation and verification algorithm. 
It is better to set the security parameter (Sec) automatically 
based on a termination time rather than configuring it by the 
address generator (owner) for the following reasons: 
 It is unreasonable to ask the user to understand the 
details of CGA algorithm to select the proper Sec 
value. But, it is possible to offer the user the possibility 
to select the value if she/he knows the details of the 
CGA algorithm. 
 It is difficult to determine the proper Sec value, 
because Sec value has an exponentially scale effect on 
both the security and the computational cost. 
 It depends on the time that the node has for configuring 
its address and on the application requirements. In 
mobile communication, the node should get its address 
within a certain time to achieve the handover. 
 Not all devices have equal CPU speeds. Especially, 
mobile and embedded computers are likely to be much 
slower than a desktop workstation. Even if the user 
knows the details of the CGA algorithm, it is hard to 
select the practical Sec value for specific device. If the 
user has the possibility to select proper parameters, it is 
good to provide her/him with, at least, rough 
estimation about the expected time for each specific 
Sec value based on his device specifications. 
 Preconfigured Sec value may compromise the security 
level. Setting the Sec to a fixed value (i.e., Sec = 0 or 
1) may reduce the security of the resulting CGA over a 
period of time. The increase of computing power 
should be corresponding with the increment of Sec 
value to maintain the same level of security against 
brute-force attacks. Therefore, Setting Sec 
automatically based on a termination time offers an 
automatic adjust of Sec value based on the CPU speed. 
Faster CPU can achieve better security level within the 
same time. Accordingly, for the same termination time, 
the security level increases over the time by increasing 
the CPU speed. For the future devices with more 
powerful CPUs, the Hash Extension increases 
automatically. 
The stopping time can be determined based on the 
maximum time for address generation. In fact, the maximum 
tolerable CGA address generation time depends on several 
factors. It depends on the device computing power, the 
particular application requirements, and other factors such as 
how long the user is willing to wait for CGA generation. 
Therefore, it is needed to select the proper termination time to 
get a feasible Sec value for CGA generation. The CPU speed of 
the address generator device can be used as an indication to the 
approximate estimation of the required CGA generates time 
[10]. In this manner, the Sec value can be selected or can be set 
indirectly to match the current available CPU speed. 
The Sec is treated exactly in the same way as in the 
standard CGA similar that there is no time parameter in used. 
The method of determining the Sec value is independent of the 
mechanism for communicating it. Also, the CGA verification 
process remains the same as it is in standard CGA. 
B. Selection the Granularity for Hash Extension Condition 
The time-based stopping condition may waste the CPU 
resources because the multiple factor “16” is relatively large. 
CGA generator computes multiple Hash2 values during a time 
period defined by the time parameter input, and the output 
value is the one which has the greatest number of zeros bits. 
Since the number of zeros is expressed in 16×Sec, the most 
secure value is determined by selecting Hash2 value that has 
the greatest number of zeros bits rounded down to the nearest 
integer multiple of “16”. Most likely the final value of Sec is 
reached early on the generation process, and the rest of the 
brute-force search will not find any better results (Sec + 1). 
Smaller multiple factor is more suitable for TB-CGA. The 
multiple factor “16” was chosen to increase the maximum 
length of the Hash Extension up to 112 bits, but the benefit of 
this is questionable for the current CPU speeds. Therefore, for 
the TB-CGA, selecting the factor “8” instead of “16” is more 
reasonable for these reasons: 
 It is more useful to round down to the nearest smaller 
multiple factor 8-bit instead of 16-bit to reduce the 
wasting time and achieve better security level. The 
chance to have “8” successive zeros is more than “16” 
successive zeros, especially for short stopping time 
parameter. Thus, having “8” zeros is better than round 
it to Sec value “0” in case the multiple factor is “16”. 
 Currently, Sec value “0” or “1” can be used in practical 
application. For Sec = 2, CGA address generation 
process may take several hours or days. So, having 
values in between (8 zeros or 24 zeros) is better than 
rounding down to the nearest integer of “16”. 
 The multiply factor “8” increases the maximum length 
of the Hash Extension up to 56 bits. Therefore, the 
total hash length will be between 59 up to 115 bits, 
which is enough for the current CPU speeds. 
C. Time-Based CGA  (TB-CGA) Generation Algorithm 
Figure 2 shows a schematic of TB-CGA generation 
algorithm. Instead of Sec value, the time parameter is used as 
an input. If the time parameter has not been exceeded, 
increment the Modifier and compute a new Hash2 value. After 
generating each Hash2 value, the number of zero bits are 
counted and compared to the number of zero bits of a previous 
computed Hash2 value. During the brute-force search loop, 
Hash2 that matches the largest number of zeros in its leftmost 
bits is stored. Besides, the corresponding Modifier which 
results to the “best” Hash2 value is stored. When the time 
parameter is exceeded and the loop terminates the Modifier 
value that produces the highest found Sec value will be used 
for the remainder of the CGA address generation and 
verification.  
IV. EXPERIMENT SETUP AND IMPLEMENTATION 
  We run our CGA implementation on guest Windows 7 
operating system hosted by Virtualbox4.1.0 software. The 
settings of VirtualBox offer the flexibility to control the CPU 
execution capacity. For example, setting the execution capacity 
to 50% means a single virtual CPU can use up to 50% of a 
single host CPU. In our experiments, the hosted machine has 
2.67 GHz CPU speed. Thus, the guest machine can use 
maximum up to 2.67 GHz. 
Windows 7 guest runs WinSEND Analyzer 
implementation. WinSEND Analyzer is a light program for 
analyzing the CGA and SEND implementation for Windows 
families. It is used to analyze WinSEND implementation [11]. 
WinSEND Analyzer uses WinSEND main classes with some 
modifications to implementTB-CGA.  
WinSEND Analyzer generates CGA based on selected 
parameters. WinSEND Analyzer Interface offers the flexibility 
for selecting the standard CGA or the TB-CGA (see Figure 3). 
Also, it offers the possibility to choose the desired CGA 
parameters. The user can select the RSA key size and 
determine how many times the CGA generation will be 
computed. If the standard CGA is used, the user can set the 
desired security level. In case the TB-CGA in use, the user sets 
the CGA stopping time and the multiple factor for Hash2 
condition (8 or 16). The final Sec value is the highest founded 
Sec value within the stopping time period. WinSEND Analyzer 
records and saves some measurements and statistics about the 
CGA generation process and writes it in an output text file. 
Figure 4 shows a part of WinSEND Analyzer output file which 
shows the CGA data structure and some other statistical 
information for TB-CGA with multiple factor “8” for stopping 
time 200 Milliseconds. 
V. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
A. Standard CGA Generation Time Measurements 
The CGA generation time measurements are taken by 
running WinSEND Analyzer on Windows 7 virtual machine 
over a range of CPU speeds started from 0.5 GHz up to 2.67 
GHz. We choose this range to study the feasibility of using 
CGA for mobile devices. Now, the modern mobile devices 
have CPU speeds around 1 GHz. Some of these devices have 
Dual core 1.2 GHz. All the measurements are done for RSA 
key size equal to 1024-bit. The CGA address is generated 1000 
times to have sufficient samples. The average (avrg.), the 
minimum (min.), and the maximum (max.) values of CGA 
generation times for Sec value “0” and “1” are recorded in 
Table I and Table II respectively. As it can be seen from Table 
I, the standard division of CGA generation time is high due to 
randomness of Hash2 and RSA key generation process. The 
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Figure 3.  TB-CGA settings parameters    
CGA parameter Data Structure 
============================ 
Final Modifier: 9e8c313519756bf4ad5515159535f674 
Subnet Prefix : 2007fe5aab8c7dc0 
Collision Count : 00 
Public Key: d48f5137175003313c013d377b6a2eb188c7ed371158d304 
73088cd090c7a954a04e0584428564fdb4a42546bef73b6b8c474785e8c0 
2e45dee98eae1c746e7c95186310471954d661a3a1842dee5f480c0dbf93 
3b65227028ebcf8d4ec34f81f1569620640e17c0e6ee4d27256994fdcaa0 
e7426f0276769fc8a166d5c182e7010001 
 
The best founded Sec value (8*Sec): 1 
Interface ID (CGA): 33e372e64fbe1439 
Key size (RSA) = 1024-bit 
Hash Algorithm: SHA-1 
Hash1: 52e372e64fbe143951cb21008bfeb5f9b8e09c71 
Hash2: 00545451ceabf1b52634d33039ce4ff225e1ee95 
 
The stopping time: 200 milliseconds 
The total number of iteration during the stopping time: 19166 
Number of iteration to find best modifier :437 
Time to find the best modifier: 140 milliseconds 
 
Figure 4. A part of WinSEND analyzer output file that shows CGA 
parameter data structure and other statistical information for TB-CGA with 
multiple factor “8” for 200 milliseconds stopping time. 
CGA generation time highly varies between the minimum and 
the maximum value.  
Here, the CGA generation time is the total duration of the 
whole CGA generation process. It includes: the time for 
generating the RSA public/private keys, the time spent 
computing a Hash2 value that matches the condition 16×Sec-
leftmost-bit of Hash2 are equal to zero, and the time for 
computing the interface identifier including Hash1 calculation. 
Beside the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) check. 
In Table II, the average number of tried modifiers indicates 
the average number of modifier values tried so far to find the 
Final Modifier in 1000 sample. Form Table II, the average 
number of iterations to find the Final Modifier over the range 
of CPU speeds from 0.5 to 2.67 GHz is 65388.56 iterations. 
This experimental result is close to the theoretical value which 
is (2
16×1 
= 65536 iterations). Therefore, we can say that 1000 
CGA samples are sufficient to get relatively accurate 
approximation to the CGA measurements. 
As expected, the average CGA generation time for Sec= 1 
is greater than the average CGA generation time for Sec =0. 
We found that increasing Sec value from “0” to “1” causes on 
average a CGA generation time to jump by a factor 469.01 
Milliseconds. Figure 5 shows the CGA generation average time 
for both Sec = 0 and Sec = 1. From Figure 5, it can be seen that 
CGA generation average time decreases by increasing CPU 
speed, the trend curve for Sec=1 is:  
TCGA(S) = 714.5 S
-0.526
 Milliseconds (1) 
Where TCGA is the average generation time and S is the CPU 
speed. Based on above equation, one can roughly predict the 
average required time to generate CGA address for Sec = 1 for 
different CPU speeds.  
CGA with Sec value greater than “1” is unpractical with 
current CPU speed. Sec value “2” could be used in the next 
upcoming years. A test on unrepresentative set of 5 samples 
which carried out on 2.67 CPU speed gives on average 
5923857 Milliseconds (1 hour and 39 minutes) CGA 
generation time. The average number of Hash2 computations is 
1703473784 times. Still, Sec value “3” is not computationally 
feasible for the current CPU speeds since Sec value increases 
the CGA computation exponentially. CGA computation for 
Sec vale “3” will take on average more than 12 years if the 
CPU speed is 2.67 GHz. 
B. Time-based CGA Generation Measurements 
For TB-CGA, the algorithm searches for the largest Sec 
value during the termination time. The extension length is 
rounded down to the nearest multiple of 16-bit. The multiple 
factor “16” is quite large and cases a big jump between the two 
successive Hash Extensions. For Sec = 1, Hash2 must contains 
16 zeros in the left most bits, while it is 32 zeros if Sec = 2. 
This large jump wastes CPU time of the address generator 
computing device because most probability the CGA 
generation algorithm will find the best Sec value early, and the 
rest of the brute-force search will not find any better Sec value. 
Figure 6 shows the total number of founded Sec values over 
a range of stopping time started from 100 Milliseconds to 1500 
Milliseconds for multiple factor “16”. The experiment was 
TABLE I.  CGA GENERATION TIME WITH SEC = 0 FOR DIFFERENT 
CPU SPEEDS. 
Virtual 
CPU speed 
(GHz) 
Sec = 0 
Number of samples (1000), RSA key size 1024-bit 
CGA generation time (Milliseconds) 
Avrg. Min. Max. STD 
0.5 251.59 30 940 119.46 
1.0 168.25 40 650 74.65 
1.5 137.79 40 510 68.13 
2.0 101.74 10 500 63.34 
2.5 97.29 10 350 50.95 
2.67 93.41 3 360 50.48 
Avrg. 142.68 --- --- --- 
TABLE II.  CGA GENERATION TIME WITH SEC = 1 FOR DIFFERENT 
CPU SPEEDS. 
Virtual 
CPU speed 
(GHz) 
Sec = 1 
Number of samples (1000), RSA key size 1024-bit 
CGA generation time (Milliseconds) Average 
number 
of tried 
Modifiers 
Avrg. Min. Max. STD 
0.5 1047.94 80 6430 802.07 66604.48 
1.0 691.82 60 3060 527.44 66920.81 
1.5 570.09 50 3190 446.51 63870.86 
2.0 512.67 50 2780 396.88 64050.86 
2.5 439.64 4 2220 388.68 67728.37 
2.67 401.99 10 2160 320.2 63155.97 
Avrg. 610.67 --- --- --- 65388.56 
 
Figure 5. CGA generation average time for Sec = 0 and Sec = 1 
 
done on a computer with 2.6 GHz. For each stopping time 
value, the CGA is computed 1000 times. As you can see from 
Figure 6, most of the time only Sec values “0” are found. The 
percentage of founded Sec value “0” is equal to 96.25% while 
it is only 3.75% for Sec value “1”, which means that most of 
the time the algorithm is busy for searching for higher Sec 
value than “1” but it rarely succeed. Therefore, it is better to 
reduce the multiple factor of successive zeros in the leftmost of 
Hash2 by using smaller multiple factor than “16”. 
Figure 7 shows the number Sec values for multiple factor 
“8”. Sec value “1” (which means 8 successive zeros) 
dominates. It forms 80.05% of the founded Sec values. And 
only 12.53 % for Sec value “0”.  The algorithm successes to 
find one Sec value “3” which is means 24 zeros in Hash2. 
Definitely, having Sec value “1” in case of using the multiple 
factor “8” is better than having Sec value “0” in case the 
multiple factor “16” by rounding these “8” zeros down to 
nearest multiple integer “16”. Sec value “1” in case of using 
the multiple factor “8” is more secure than Sec value “0” with 
multiple factor “16”. Multiple factor “16” wastes the CPU 
computation without achieving better security level especially 
for short stopping time or for slow CPU speeds.    
VI. CONCLUSION  
CGA is an IPv6 bound to owner’s public key. It provides 
an authentication mechanism in a decentralized way. The 
security parameter (Sec) has a great impact on the CGA 
generation time and it makes CGAs computationally costly. 
Fulfilling the second hash (Hash2) condition is the 
computationally expensive part of CGA generation. 
In this paper we presented a practical and automatic way 
for selecting the Sec parameter for CGA generation algorithm. 
In this modified version, the time is taken as an input and then 
the Sec value is determined as an output of the brute-force 
search to satisfy Hash2 condition. The security level is 
determined automatically based on the computing device CPU 
power available for hash generation. Faster devices are able to 
find a better Sec value than slower ones for the same time. The 
communication of Sec value and CGA verification process 
remains the same as the standard CGA. For Time-base CGA, 
we recommend the use of multiple factor “8” instead of “16” in 
Hash Extension condition. The use of factor “8” reduces the 
steps between the successive Sec values and consequently 
reduces wasting computation to find better Sec vale. 
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Figure  6. The number and the percentage of founded Sec values over a range 
of stopping time for multiple factor “16” 
 
 
Figure 7. The number and the percentage of founded Sec values over a range 
of stopping time for multiple factor “8” 
